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Abstract. Can artificial systems be creative? Can they be designed to be creative on their
own? And what are the requirements of such creative artificial systems? To be able to support
humans who are expected to deliver creative solutions, or to automate part of their tasks, this
paper presents a proposal for creativity requirements that provide a basis for designing
creative artificial systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Creativity has been, and still is, a subject of scientific research in disciplines such as
Philosophy, Information Systems Science, Cognitive Science, Artificial Intelligence, and
Engineering. Boden has inspired many researchers in different disciplines with her work on
the nature of creativity and the cognitive mechanisms and structures that play a role in
creativity. In (Boden, 1991), she addresses the following four issues, called the Lovelace
questions:
• (LQ-1) Can computational ideas help us understand how human creativity is possible?
• (LQ-2) Could computers ever do things that at least appear to be creative?
• (LQ-3) Could a computer ever appear to recognise creativity?
• (LQ-4) Could computers ever really be creative (i.e., not due to the human programmer)?
This paper concentrates on the second and the fourth of these questions. Abstracting from
computers, the underlying question is whether a system can be designed to be creative on its
own. This question is of interest not only for scientific reasons but for practical purposes as
well. If a system could be designed to be creative, it would be able to support humans who
are expected to deliver creative solutions, or to automate part of their tasks. Applications of
creative artificial systems could prove valuable for domains such as industrial design and
architecture.
However, in the past little attention has been paid to the definition of requirements for
creativity. This paper presents such creativity requirements. On the basis of related research
on creativity, Section 2 postulates what a creative system is, and Section 3 presents our
creativity requirements. Section 4 compares a number of creative systems reported in the
literature, and Section 5 discusses the feasibility of artificial creative systems given our
definitions. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results of this paper.
2. CREATIVE SYSTEMS
This section reviews a number of research papers on creativity, as the basis for our definition
of creative system.
2.1 Related research on creativity
In disciplines such as Philosophy, Information Systems Science, Cognitive Science, Artificial
Intelligence, and Engineering, researchers have defined and described creativity. The body of
literature on creativity is far too large to discuss at length. This subsection discusses a
selection of research papers.
In research literature, many definitions of creativity can be found. Boden (1991) has laid
the ground for many of the views on creativity. She claims that creativity is “a matter of using
one’s computational resources to explore, and sometimes to break out of, familiar conceptual
spaces.” She distinguishes psychological creativity (P-creativity), which occurs when a
person has an idea that he or she could not have had before, and historical creativity (H-
creativity), which occurs when someone has an idea that has not been recorded before. Boden
further distinguishes exploratory creativity (E-creativity) and transformational creativity (T-
creativity), for which Wiggins (2003) provides a logical formalisation. In the context of
design, Suwa et al. (2000) have added the notion of situated creativity (S-creativity), which
occurs when a designer has an idea for a specific task, which is novel in that particular
situation.
Edmonds and Candy (2002) define creativity as a process toward achieving an outcome
recognised as innovative, and describe creative work as involving the generation and
evaluation of new ideas, solutions, and artefacts. They state that the exceptional outcomes of
creative work may be evaluated (and valued) by others, but that they are not necessarily
recognised as exceptional outside the knowledgeable group (e.g., peers). Edmonds and Candy
characterise outstanding creativity as that which has stood the test of time and has become
recognised beyond the community of specialists.
Human creativity is diverse, leading both to differences in the degree of creativity and the
style of creativity. Kirton (1976) distinguishes two creativity styles: adapters and innovators.
Adapters improve things, are conforming and efficient, and like to deal with only a few ideas
at a time. Innovators ignore or challenge systems, contribute radical proposals for change, are
non-conforming and inefficient, and like ideas to proliferate. Talbot (1997) provides a
definition of creativity, including both these styles of creativity: “making a change that sticks
(for a while).” Where adapters generate evolutionary changes (in order to make things better),
innovators are responsible for revolutionary changes (to make things different). This
definition encapsulates a cyclic notion: a change is applied in the real world, accepted by
interested parties for a certain amount of time because of its value, and later another change is
applied, thereby repeating the cycle. Cohen (2002) supports this notion that creativity applies
to continuous change.
Liu (2000) describes a framework for understanding creativity, which distinguishes
personal creativity and social-cultural creativity, and their interaction. A proposed solution
can become creative only when the creative person recognises it as being a creative result, he
or she proves it to the world, and the world accepts it. Dias de Figueiredo and Campos (2001)
investigate the relation between serendipity (i.e., finding valuable things not sought for) and
creativity. They introduce a logical formalism to describe serendipity, thereby aiming to
distinguish serendipity from other manifestations of creativity.
A number of researchers regard motivation of humans and interaction and collaboration
between humans as essential conditions for creativity. Fischer and Nakakoji (1997) state that,
though creative individuals are often thought of working in isolation, the role of interaction
and collaboration with other individuals is also critical. Similarly, cognitive scientists and
system scientists observe that for human creativity it is important to create a stress-free,
stimulating working environment with ample facilities for collaboration and exchange of
ideas, and where making mistakes is allowed or even encouraged (e.g., Weatherall, 1998;
Candy & Edmonds, 2000; Greene, 2002). Kletke et al. (2001) state that creativity occurs
when: (a) the product has novelty and value, (b) the thinking is unconventional, requiring
modification, rejection, or synthesis of previous ideas, (c) the thinking requires motivation,
persistence, and high intensity over a period of time, or (d) the initial problem is vague, or ill-
defined.
AI researchers and cognitive scientists add that learning and interaction with the
environment are important or necessary aspects of being creative (e.g., Simon, 1969; Boden,
1991; Candy, 1997). According to Sim and Duffy (2000), learning may happen before the
start of a design activity (provisional learning), in parallel with a design activity in progress
(in-situ learning), and after completion of a design activity (retrospective learning). In the
field of design, Gero (2002) states that the interaction between the designer and the
environment strongly determines the course of designing, which he calls situatedness: an
interpretation process being governed both by an original experience and by what the current
situation makes with it.
Assessing creativity is partly subjective, similar to art appreciation (e.g., Candy et al.,
2002), humour (e.g., Gero, 1996), and intelligence (e.g., Stefik, 1995). The assessor’s
background, social influences and individual characteristics all play a role (Csikszentmihalyi,
1999). Also knowing the state of the art is influential: different assessors may disagree in
their judgement of the same subject (e.g., Besemer & Treffinger, 1981; Boden, 1991; Finke et
al., 1992; Gero, 1996; Pease et al., 2001; Edmonds & Candy, 2002; Macedo & Cardoso,
2002; Tang & Gero, 2002). Colton et al. (2001) state that, when assessing the creativity of
computer programs, assessors should only consider those valuable novelties produced by a
computer program that have not been included to instigate creative results, either pre-
programmed or the result of fine-tuning the program.
Creativity has attracted the attention of many Artificial Intelligence in Design researchers.
Goel (1997) claims that creativity in design can occur in degrees. He states that a design
process is routine if the designer knows both the structure of the design space as well as
procedures for systematically searching the space, innovative if the designer knows only the
structure of the design space, and creative if the designer knows neither. Gero (2000) speaks
of routine designing when all necessary design knowledge is available, innovative designing
when the context that constrains the available ranges of the values for the variables is
jettisoned so that unexpected values become possible, and creative designing when one or
more new variables are introduced into the design. Dorst and Cross (2001) state that the
creativity of the design is influenced by the design problem, the design situation, and the
resources (time) available, as well as the designer’s own goals. They claim that defining and
framing the design problem is a key aspect of creativity, and that surprise is what keeps a
designer from routine behaviour.
Many researchers have made an effort to describe creative processes. Perkins (1981)
claims that when an individual combines the elements of ideas generation, problem
formulation, strategy selection, methods acquisition, and updating of expert knowledge (by
using a network of contacts with experts in the field), in a unique way he or she may produce
creative results.
Amabile (1983) distinguishes five stages of creative problem solving. In the problem or
task presentation stage, a specific problem statement is formulated. In the preparation stage,
recall of information and solution approaches that appear to be relevant to the problem at
hand occurs. In the response generation stage, candidate solutions are produced whereas in
the response validation stage, candidate solutions are evaluated. In the outcome stage, a
favourable solution is chosen, no acceptable solution is determined, or backtracking to a
previous stage occurs.
Finke et al. (1992) introduce the Geneplore model, the heart of which is an interaction
between generative processes and exploratory processes. In these processes, cognitive
structures termed preinventive structures are produced and used, which represent novel visual
patterns, object forms, mental models, verbal combinations, etc.
Ram et al. (1995) define five aspects of thought: inference mechanism, knowledge source,
tasks, situation, and strategy. They state that creative thought involves processes of problem
interpretation and reformulation, case and model retrieval, elaboration and adaptation, and
evaluation. To produce ideas, the types of inferential mechanisms are applied in a flexible
and highly opportunistic manner throughout the process, with their application heavily
influenced by the other four aspects of thought.
Lawson (1997) describes a five-stage model of a creative process. In the first insight stage,
the problem is formulated. In the preparation stage, a conscious attempt is made to reach a
solution. The same is done in the incubation stage, but with no (apparent) conscious effort. In
the illumination stage, suddenly an idea emerges, and in the verification stage, this idea is
consciously developed to a solution. Lawson claims that human problem solvers can and do
modify their process in response to the variability of the problem structure.
Shneiderman (2002) establishes a framework for creative work, consisting of four
activities. The collection activity is to learn from previous works stored in different sources.
The relation activity is to consult with peers and mentors. The creation activity is to explore,
compose, and evaluate possible solutions. The donation activity is to disseminate the results
and contribute to different sources. Shneiderman states that these four activities do not form a
linear path: creative work may require a return to earlier phases and much iteration.
Santanen et al. (2002) describe the Cognitive Network Model of creativity, which is based
on the assumption that knowledge can be represented as complex bundles of information
(frames) that are highly associative. By traversing the links that connect some activated frame
to other frames within the network, activation of successive frames spreads through memory
causing yet other frames to become primed for subsequent activation. Santanen et al. state
that creativity emerges when two or more frames from areas not typically associated with one
another are brought together in the context of the problem at hand.
2.2 Our definition of creative system
On the basis of the related research on creativity, this section defines our perspective on
creative systems..
Definition 1 (Agent). An agent is a human or artificial entity, who or which acts
autonomously and pro-actively, and may exhibit social behaviour and intelligence.
Definition 1 is based on a prevailing perspective on agents formulated by, among others,
Wooldridge and Jennings (1995). For an overview of agent technologies, application
domains, and technological challenges, refer to, for example, Luck et al. (2003).
Definition  2 (System). A system is a whole of one or more agents.
A system may consist of human agents (i.e., a human system), artificial agents (i.e., an
artificial system), or a mix of human and artificial agents (i.e., a hybrid system). For example,
a team of designers qualifies as a system, as does the combination of a human designer and
his or her design support system.
Definition 3 (Creative Result). A system’ s result is creative in the opinion of an assessor if
the assessor recognises the result as being new, unexpected, and valuable.
Being creative applies in principle to all tasks and domains of application (e.g.,
architecture, management, music composition, and software development). Definition 3 is in
line with Boden’ s (1991) definitions of P-creative idea and H-creative idea and Suwa et al.’ s
(2000) definition of S-invention. Note that according to this assumption, the system and the
assessor may be the same entity, but to avoid confusion, this paper assumes that system and
assessor are different.
Definition 3 shows that whether a result is creative or not is ‘in the eye of the beholder’
and a question of scope. One assessor may judge a system’ s result to be creative, another not.
The reasons for this may be a difference in background or expertise or a difference in what
they know about the system. For example, two people may well disagree about whether or
not the selected design for a new city hall is creative. This may be due, for instance, to the
fact that one is a peer and the other is a layman, or one knows the architect’ s work well and
the other does not, or one knows what the old city hall looked like and the other does not. The
creativity assessment problem is, for example, described by Besemer and Treffinger (1981).
Besemer and Treffinger analyse possible creativity criteria by means of a creative product
analysis matrix, involving three dimensions: novelty, resolution, and elaboration & synthesis.
For each dimension, specific 'measurable' criteria are distinguished.
Furthermore, Definition 3 implicitly refers to time. An assessor may now consider a result
to be new and unexpected, but not valuable and therefore not creative. This may be due to the
assessor’ s lack of understanding of the result: if the novelty is too radical for him or her, s/he
cannot recognise the result as valuable. The same assessor may later consider the result to be
creative after all, after s/he has acquired an understanding of it. This observation is consistent
with the work of other researchers. Creative results are results that are similar to, yet different
from, expected results (Gero, 1996; Saunders & Gero, 2002), and ideas that may first be
viewed as “ ridiculous, idiotic or outrageous”  may be valued as “ good”  years later (Thomas et
al., 2002).
Definition 4 (Creative System). A system is creative in the opinion of an assessor if,
according to the assessor, the system sufficiently often produces creative results.
Definition 4 is again in line with the definitions of P-creativity, H-creativity, and S-
creativity. This Definition supposes that the creativity of a system is assessed on the basis of a
number of (creative) results it produces. Co-incidence and luck can never be ruled out as
explanations for apparent creativity of a system; any system can, at least in principle, appear
to be creative in a single case, but repeated creativity is harder to achieve (Fischer &
Nakakoji, 1997).
The distinction between assessor and system raises issues regarding the informedness of
the assessor with respect to the system and vice versa. An assessor who already knows the
system has an expectation of the system’ s capabilities, which may result in a different
assessment than that of an uninformed assessor. Vice versa, a system that knows it will be
assessed and by whom, may produce different results than when it would not know its
assessor in advance. Assessors are not the main topic of this paper and therefore will not be
discussed further; it suffices to remark that automating creativity recognition (i.e., the third
Lovelace question) is still an open research field (e.g., Boden, 1998).
3. CREATIVITY REQUIREMENTS
An artificial system that is meant to be creative must be designed in such a way that, when it
is operational, it will produce enough creative results that are new, unexpected, and valuable
in the eye of its assessors (e.g., customers, users, and other stakeholders). This section focuses
on the creativity requirements of such an artificial system.
Definition 5 (Creativity Requirements). A creative system must be able to (1) interact with
its environment, (2) learn, and (3) self-organise (i.e., plan, execute, control, and change its
process).
A creative system must be able to interact with its environment, for that is the only way, in
the long run, to acquire knowledge about the state of the art and current needs and, thus,
about what would be new and valuable. Furthermore, a creative system must be able to learn,
for that is the only way, in the long run, to adapt knowledge acquired through its interactions
with the environment and through its own experiences. Finally, a creative system must be
able to self-organise, for that is the only way, in the long run, to be unpredictable in its
operations and, thus, to deliver unexpected results. Figure 1 shows a creative system to be a
system that satisfies each of these three requirements.
Creativity
Ability to
self-organise
Ability to
interact
Ability to
learn
Figure 1. Three requirements for creativity.
A system’ s ability to be creative is essential to finding solutions to problems it may
encounter when trying to perform a given task. In this context, a problem is defined as a lack
of knowledge to transform a system’ s specific state to some desired state (Thomas et al.,
2002). Through communication, observation, and sub-processes such as recall of earlier
experiences, analysis, and association (Gabora, 2002; Gero & Kannengiesser, 2002; Santanen
et al., 2002), new knowledge can be generated that enables the mismatch to be solved.
To explain why a creative system must satisfy each of these three requirements, consider
the following three cases. First, suppose there is a system that interacts with its environment
but that does not learn or self-organise. As a consequence, given a similar task, this system
will produce a similar result in the same way. Although this system can solve problems in a
conventional sense, this is insufficient for creativity. Even if the result is assessed to be
creative the first time round, it won’ t necessarily be assessed to be creative in a similar
situation a second time round.
Second, suppose there is a system that interacts and learns but that does not self-organise.
As a consequence, given a similar task, this system may produce a different result but always
in the same way. Although this system can explore, this is insufficient for creativity. Even if a
number of results are assessed to be creative, over time the assessor may gradually acquire an
understanding of the way that the system works, hence be able to predict the outcome, and
thus no longer be surprised by the results.
Third, suppose there is a system that interacts and self-organises, but that does not learn.
As a consequence, given a similar task, this system may produce a different result but
according to a fixed procedure depending on the organisation of the system. Although this
system can adapt its behaviour to a certain extent, this is generally insufficient for creativity.
Even if a number of results are assessed to be creative, the system will (tend to) organise
itself in a similar way in a similar situation, and thus produce similar results, and hence be
predictable.
4. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS WITH REGARDS TO CREATIVITY
Before discussing the combination of our three creativity requirements introduced in the
previous section, it is important to investigate the feasibility of each individual creativity
requirement. This section analyses systems reported in literature with regards to our creativity
requirements of being able to interact, learn, and self-organise.
4.1 Interactive systems
An interactive system is a system that is able to interact with its environment when
performing a task (such as diagnosis, designing, planning, or scheduling). Such a system is
able to acquire knowledge through communication, and to act within its environment, for
example by asking questions, looking around, visiting external information sources, making
drawings or schemas, and discussing opinions and proposals with stakeholders.
Humans are, of course, good examples of interactive systems, as are combinations of
humans and software applications (e.g., a manager using a decision support system).
Interactive artificial systems also exist, such as applications composed of many (mobile)
software agents or robots. In a multi-agent system, interaction with the environment may be
delegated within the system to specialised communication agents, which accept information
requests of other agents within the system and pass on acquired information from the
environment to these agents using languages such as FIPA/ACL (for details, refer to
http://www.fipa.org/repository/aclspecs.html).
4.2 Learning systems
A learning system is a system that is able to acquire new knowledge and to ‘forget’  obsolete
knowledge. Such a system is able to use its experiences, so that in similar future situations
good practices are repeated and poor practices avoided.
Again, humans are good examples of learning systems, as are combinations of humans and
software applications such as a knowledge engineer maintaining an expert system (e.g.,
Stefik, 1995). Artificial learning systems are available for many tasks and many domains of
application. In design, examples of such systems are knowledge-based agents (e.g., Grecu &
Brown, 1996), machine learning systems (e.g., Duffy, 1997), clustering mechanisms (e.g.,
Reffat & Gero, 2000), neural networks (e.g., Saunders & Gero, 2002), and genetic algorithms
(e.g., Gero, 1996; Cho, 2002).
4.3 Self-organising systems
A self-organising system is a system that is able to organise and re-organise its own process,
when needed, in order to achieve its task and produce good results. Such a system is able to
make changes to its internal operations, in response to a changing environment or a problem
encountered when trying to achieve its task.
Humans are able to self-organise, although this ability may be difficult to master. Habits,
especially old ones, are hard to give up even if one knows better. Moreover, the more people
are involved in ta system, the more rigid it operates—a small firm is usually quicker than a
large company in adapting its organisation to a changing market (Carley et al., 1998), and
small projects are usually easier to redirect than large projects. Candy and Edmonds (2000)
observe that creative people are notorious for resisting rigid approaches, and are not afraid to
choose pathways fraught with risk and potential pitfalls.
In Artificial Intelligence, the advent of multi-agent systems has offered new perspectives
for self-organising artificial systems. The behaviour of multi-agent systems is analysed in
terms of the interactions between different agents, so self-organisation and self-regulation are
considered emergent properties of such interactions (Holland, 1995). Two approaches can be
distinguished: the small-agents approach and the big-agents approach. The small-agents
approach is inspired by biology (e.g., ants), where many small agents with individually
simplistic behaviour together yield surprisingly complex behaviour (e.g., Bonabeau &
Theraulaz, 2000). The big-agents approach is based on heterogeneous agents in a dynamic
environment, where the challenge is to describe aggregate behaviour of individually complex,
rational agents (e.g., Ferber et al., 2004).
5. FEASIBILITY OF CREATIVE ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS
A creative system, as defined in Section 3, is a system consisting of one or more human
agents or artificial agents that is able to interact with its environment, learn, and self-organise.
In this paper, artificial systems have our main interest, but this section also pays attention to
systems that support humans to be creative.
5.1 Creativity support systems
For design, there exist a number of systems that support (groups of) human designers. For
example, Chaplin et al. (1994) and Bracewell and Sharpe (1996) describe an integrated
design support tool called SchemeBuilder, aimed at supporting a multidisciplinary systems
designer in the conceptual and embodiment stages of design. This tool provides guidance and
suggestions, and allows the human designer to play a more active role in applying design
judgements. Candy (1997) describes creativity support in design as the integration of
functions for (1) knowledge evaluation and extension, (2) sketching, annotation, and other
ways to present visual data, and (3) collaboration among design team members. Candy
describes a prototypical creativity support system, VPKSS, which aids designers at the
conceptual stage of the automotive design process.
Fischer and Nakakoji (1997) and Fischer (2001) describe a framework for developing so-
called domain-oriented design environments (DODEs), which support designers collaborating
asynchronously in being creative. A DODE supports the retrieval of information relevant to
the task at hand, and the modification and addition of information and functionality to the
design environment, in particular externalisations that capture and articulate the task at hand.
Aihara and Hori (1998) describe a system named En Passant 2, which aids the process of
creative thinking by a scientist. Based on Finke et al.’ s (1992) Geneplore model, the system
stores the user’ s research notes and marks recognised features for the user, so that he or she
may recall earlier research in the current context.
Reffat and Gero (2000) describe a system called SLiDe (Situated Learning in Design),
supporting designers in conceptual geometric design by providing alternative representations
and maintaining the situation of the designer’ s focus. SLiDe learns the applicability
conditions of architectural design knowledge by capturing the regularities of relevant
relationships among architectural shapes across different design states, so that it can locate
shapes that are relevant to the design situation at hand.
Shneiderman (2002) describes the support of human designers to consist of what-if tools
for exploration as well as tools for composing artefacts: (1) provide access to exemplars,
templates, and blank artefact descriptions, (2) suggest ways to transform the artefact
description, and (3) offer checking services and assessment of design results. Amigoni and
Schiaffonati (2003) develop a multi-agent system for the design of museum organisations or
art exhibitions. Their system supports human creativity by facilitating the categorisation of art
objects, their allocation and visualisation of their exhibit, according to user-specific
guidelines. Users are thus alleviated from low-level tasks, and can focus on more abstract
concepts, exploring more alternatives.
5.2 Nearly creative artificial design systems
A few design systems come close to being creative artificial systems. Grecu and Brown
(1996) describe a multi-agent system for designing springs, which consists of single-function
agents (SiFAs). Each SiFA is a small (knowledge-based) expert agent, which operates
autonomously, negotiates bilaterally (using pre-programmed strategies) with other SiFAs to
reach an agreement about a specific aspect of the spring design, and which learns to reduce
the overhead of inter-agent communication.
Campbell et al. (1998) describe the A-Design framework for adaptive systems of
interacting agents for creating and adapting conceptual engineering designs. This framework
contains a detailed functional representation of the electro-mechanical domain, as well as
agent strategies. To meet the objectives specified by a user, the agents compete and
collaborate to constantly improve upon design alternatives. Throughout the iterative process
and interactions between different types of agents, the manager agents make decisions about
which designs are better and how the agents should be grouped, penalised, or rewarded for
their past performance. Key design alternatives are retained to allow the concerned design
system the flexibility to adjust to any changes in the design specifications made by the user
throughout the design process.
Saunders and Gero (2001; 2002) study artificial creativity as an emergent property of the
interactions between individual agents in an artificial society. In the Digital Clockwork Muse,
they explore the role that an individual’ s search for novelty plays in socially situated creative
systems. In this system, individual agents judge the potential creativity of artworks as they are
produced. Each design agent includes a neural network to detect novelty, but different agents
have different built-in preferences for novelty. The results of the simulations show that while
an agent must innovate to be considered creative, it must do so at a pace that matches its
audience to achieve recognition. To avoid being ignored, an agent must produce some
significant novelty that sets its work apart from previous examples but not too far from those
examples. The system itself, though, is not creative: since its process does not change,
repeating a simulation with the same agents and same settings for preferred novelty (more or
less) yields the same results.
Cohen (2002) developed the AARON artistic computer program, which is widely
recognised as creative, yet not so considered by Cohen himself. Cohen argues that AARON
may be considered creative when the program becomes more autonomous, so it can modify
the criteria it uses to form knowledge, instead of only modifying its knowledge.
Brazier and Wijngaards (2001) focus on how to design self-modifying agents, where self-
modification applies to an agent’ s specific tasks as well as all processes within an agent
except for the self-modification process itself. A self-modifying agent needs to monitor its
own behaviour, be able to decide when its behaviour is not appropriate, and know what
behaviour is required and how to effectuate a modification to its own system. Brazier and
Wijngaards describe a knowledge-level model of a self-modifying agent and apply it to a
mobile information retrieval agent on the World Wide Web. In addition, Brazier and
Wijngaards (2002) explain how to redesign software agents by using an agent factory to
redesign and reactivate an agent on the basis of its current design, requirements provided by
the agent and/or knowledge available within the agent factory. In the current
implementations, the design process within the agent factory is relatively well defined. The
resulting agents, however, may evolve in ways their designers could never have anticipated:
their abilities can change substantially. This agent factory approach is also used in a different
domain, namely web services: needs of Internet end-users form web service requirements that
lead to configurations of web services (Richards et al., 2003).
6. DISCUSSION
In this paper, a creative system is assumed to be a system consisting of one or more human or
artificial agents, which acts purposefully and autonomously within an environment, and
which (in the opinion of an assessor) sufficiently often produces results that are new,
unexpected, and valuable. These definitions about creativity are compatible with those found
in other research papers from disciplines such as Philosophy, Cognitive Science, Artificial
Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence in Design, Information Systems Science, and Engineering.
Our proposal for creativity requirements states that a creative system must be able to
interact with its environment, learn, and self-organise. These requirements provide a basis for
designing new systems that are meant to be creative. Since these requirements are stated in
generic terms, they apply to creative systems regardless of the task and the domain of
application. Related research papers also identify interaction with the environment and
learning as key aspects of creativity, but not often self-organisation, perhaps since most
research papers focus on specific tasks and domains of application.
The set of creativity requirements proposed in this paper may not be complete: a system
that satisfies the requirements that it must interact, learn, and self-organise, may still not be
creative. But it is yet unclear if the proposed set of creativity requirements can be extended
and how. Additional creativity requirements are probably refinements of the three proposed
requirements, for instance by determining what is learned, how interaction with the
environment takes place, and when the system’ s process is re-organised. The role of assessors
also needs to be studied to a greater extent: creativity is a subjective concept, for which it
may be impossible to formulate necessary and sufficient requirements at all.
Multi-agent systems could be a kind of artificial system that can be creative. Further
research is required to develop a multi-agent theory that covers interaction with an
environment, learning, and self-organisation, whereas practical experiments will have to
demonstrate the applicability and validity of such a theory.
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